Introduction
In this chapter, we use the term "social cognition" to refer to the fundamental abilities to perceive, categorize, remember, analyze, reason with and behave toward other conspecifics (Adolphs, 2001; Nelson et al., 2005; Pelphrey et al., 2004) . This definition is wide-ranging, so as to emphasize the multidisciplinary quality of work in this area. However, scientific disciplines vary in their emphasis on different aspects of this multifaceted construct. In social psychology, social cognition describes a range of phenomena including moral reasoning, attitude formation, stereotyping, and related topics (Kunda, 1999) . In neuroscience, social cognition is defined more narrowly as the ability to perceive the intentions and dispositions of others (Brothers, 1990) . In developmental psychology, the characterization of social cognition has focused most frequently upon the study of "theory of mind" (ToM), the awareness that other people have beliefs and desires different from our own and that behavior can be explained by reference to these beliefs and desires (Frith and Frith, 1999; Premack and Woodruff, 1978) . Across disciplines, definitions of social cognition commonly link this construct to social behavior and include social perception (the initial stages of evaluating intentions and dispositions of others by analysis of gaze direction, body movement, and other types of biological motion 1 ), and attributional style (the way one tends to explain other people's behavior).
Much of the neural circuitry thought to support social cognition consists of mechanisms that are relatively old in evolutionary terms. The world in which the human brain carries out its functions, however, has changed dramatically over a relatively short period. For example, a child born 50 000 years ago would have very similar mental abilities as a child today, but a decidedly different set of demands, aspirations, and opportunities, not to mention rights, responsibilities, chances of survival, and definitions of success. Nonetheless, the extent to which social cognitive processes functioned successfully helped to determine the fate of individual humans in the past and continues to do so today. For much of the twentieth century, psychologists produced theories and a wealth of empirical evidence concerning the basic building blocks of social cognition. This understanding has now begun to benefit from the use of noninvasive brain imaging techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), to identify a network of brain regions supporting various facets of social cognition.
In the past decade, fMRI studies of how we think about our and others' minds, how we mimic others, change our attitudes, and how we perceive emotions have allowed us to learn about the paths toward better and worse mental health outcomes. However, much of this work has focused on the mature minds of adult humans. Few studies have examined brain mechanisms for social cognition in children. At the same time, within developmental psychology, behavioral research has examined the age-related development of social cognition, but often neglected the goal of identifying mechanisms of change (Siegler, 2000) . Regrettably, few studies have addressed the crucial question of the processes and mechanisms by which social cognition develops, leaving this area wide open to investigation.
Advances in techniques for imaging the developing brain are now providing exciting opportunities for studying the brain mechanisms involved in the development of social cognition abilities, opening up a new field of research called developmental social cognitive neuroscience. Work in this emerging field stems from direct collaboration among cognitive neuroscientists, developmental psychologists, and social psychologists. In this chapter, we review studies that have examined the development of neural mechanisms for selected social cognitive processes. In particular, we focus on those studies that have employed fMRI to study the brain mechanisms involved in the development of social perception, emotion understanding, and ToM. To provide a context for these neuroscientific studies, we begin by outlining selected studies from a large body of rich and elegant behavioral research describing the developmental trajectories of these key facets of social cognition. A second section reviews the brain mechanisms studied in adult social cognition. Finally, we review studies of the developing social brain and present (Table 5 .1) neuroimaging studies that have investigated social perception, face processing, emotion understanding, and ToM in typically developing children.
Development of social cognition

Understanding others' goals and intentions
Social perception is one of the earliest developing aspects of social cognition. Very young infants are sensitive to the goal-directed structure of other people's actions, as well as their direction of gaze. Within the first 6 months of life, infants develop a basic understanding of the intentions and goal-directed structure underlying biological motion (Sommerville et al., 2005; Woodward, 1998) . For example, Woodward (1998) habituated 5-to 8-month-old infants to a reaching and grasping human hand. The infants looked longer when the object of the motion changed (intentional aspect) than when the direction of the reaching changed (physical aspect), suggesting an awareness and attribution of goals. Other research indicates that the infant's attribution of goals is not restricted to human actors, but includes nonhuman, machine-like agents capable of mimicking biological (animate) movement (Gergely and Csibra, 1997; Johnson et al., 2001) .
By 18 months, toddlers distinguish between the intended goal of an action and its accidental consequences and become more discerning with regard to their attributions of intention (Carpenter et al., 1998; Meltzoff, 1995) . Meltzoff (1995) recorded the reactions of 18-month-olds to an experimenter's actions upon a novel toy. The experimenter attempted to pull off the end of a dumbbell-shaped toy, but failed when his hand slipped. When encouraged to imitate, the infants typically imitated the intended, rather than the observed, action. In contrast, when a nonhuman apparatus, consisting of two arm-like parts, attempted the same action and goal with the toy, yet failed in the same fashion as the experimenter, the children imitated the observed action rather than the desired goal. The author argued that the children were able to attribute the behavior of the human to deeper goals and intentions. 
Perceiving eye gaze: linking actions and intentions
In addition to appearing to take an "intentional stance" (Dennet, 1987) toward the analysis of hand and arm movements, over the first year of life infants begin to link goals and intentions to eye gaze. A referential concept of gaze (i.e., the understanding that perception depends on a relationship between a person and an object) emerges toward the end of the first year (Brooks and Meltzoff, 2002; Caron et al., 2002 , but see Doherty and Anderson, 1999) . Brooks and colleagues (described in Caron et al., 2002 ) adapted Woodward's (1998) paradigm to measure referential understanding of perception. When 14-month-old infants were habituated to an adult turning toward an object, they looked longer when the adult later looked to the same location, rather than to the new location when the object was moved, indicating possible surprise that the adult was no longer pursuing the goal object. This effect, however, only occurred if the actor's eyes were open during habituation, suggesting that the infants understood that looking, but not necessarily direction of movement, is goal-directed. Within the vast repertoire of human behavior, gaze is among the most potent of social cues, with mutual gaze often signaling threat or approach and averted gaze conveying submission or avoidance (e.g., Argyle and Cook, 1976; Darwin, 1872; Kleinke, 1986) . Processing of eye gaze is fundamental to social interactions, as illustrated by its early emergence in ontogeny and disruption in autism (e.g., Hood et al., 1998; Pelphrey et al., 2002) . Infants as young as 7 weeks attend to the eyes of faces during social interaction (Haith et al., 1977) and express a preference for faces with open eyes by 3 months of age (Bakti et al., 2000) . These findings suggest a rudimentary appreciation of the significance of eyes vis-à-vis their social value. Eye contact and gaze following are not only key components of social perception, but they modulate other cognitive processes during infancy and later development. For instance, Hood and colleagues (2003) asked both adults and 6-to 7-year-old children to memorize faces from photographs that were making direct eye contact with the viewer or gazing in other directions. During a test phase in which the faces were presented with closed eyes, both adults and children were better able to identify individuals who displayed direct gaze in the original pictures. This study illustrates the importance of gaze in basic face perception and, possibly, the beginnings of social interaction. Eye contact in the context of joint attention has also been linked prospectively to ToM development. Charman and colleagues (2000) tested 20-month-old infants on various joint attention tasks relating to interaction with both adults and a moving toy. At 3.5 years of age, children who had previously demonstrated more advanced joint attention abilities scored higher on a standard false belief task, underscoring an early link between basic building blocks of social cognition and later ToM.
Perceiving emotions
In addition to parsing the social world according to the analysis of agents, their actions, goals, and intentions, individuals use emotion as an important source of information about others. Newborn infants show sensitivity to, and synchrony with, others' emotions. Field and Walden (1982a) observed that neonates cry when other infants cry and discriminate between happy and sad facial expressions. Neonates (as young as 36 h) also display some discrimination and imitation of facial expression. Field and colleagues (1982) observed the facial expressions of newborns in response to models' discrete emotional expressions. Independent observers were able to determine the model's posed emotion from the facial display of the infant, who imitated that expression. Similarly, Meltzoff and Moore (1983) observed young infants' imitations of modeled facial expressions and suggested that this early form of imitation might provide a basis for emotion perception. In addition, Nelson and colleagues (1979) found evidence for early discrimination of fearful and happy faces. Further studies confirm that infants can reliably distinguish facial expressions in the second half of their first year of life (Caron et al., 1988; Nelson, 1987) .
The development of facial expression recognition and understanding of the situational determinants of emotion continues to develop throughout early childhood. For example, 3-year-olds are able to match drawings of people with the same facial expression to each other (Walden and Field, 1982) and produce a facial expression to match a verbal label that can be easily guessed by adults (Field and Walden, 1982b) . Children as young as 2 years are able to assign a verbal emotion label to an emotional expression. At 3 years of age, they are consistently able to attach the correct emotional facial expression to a faceless puppet that re-enacts an emotional story (Denham, 1986) . Finally, Camras and Allison (1985) reported that preschool children are able to match emotions with stories both verbally, by naming an emotion, and nonverbally, by pointing to facial expression in a photograph, with great (over 80%) accuracy. This skill continues to improve well into middle childhood. All of these studies of emotion perception report variability related to specific emotions, with happiness being the easiest and disgust and surprise being the most difficult to identify, enact, and match.
Aside from discriminating emotions conveyed by facial expressions, infants use this information to guide their own actions, a skill referred to as "social referencing" (Feinman, 1992) . Sorce and colleagues (1985) reported that 1-year-old infants used such emotional information to resolve perceived ambiguities in the environment. In a now classic experiment, infants looked to their mother when prompted by the experimenter to cross to the deep side of a visual cliff. If the mother posed a happy facial expression, infants were more likely to cross than if the mother posed a fearful or angry facial expression. Finally social referencing to emotional cues can occur in both the visual and auditory domains. For instance, Mumme and others (1996) reported that fearful maternal vocalizations were sufficient to regulate 1-year-old infants' behavior without the accompanying facial expression. Strikingly, 5-month-old infants have been found to respond to negative speech intonations even outside their native language and to use this emotional information to direct their behavior (Fernald, 1993) .
By 14 months, infants can combine information about a person's gaze and emotion both to infer the person's goal and to direct their own actions. For instance, infants observed an actor looking, smiling, and positively vocalizing toward one of two objects and later observed the actor holding that same object or the second object. Infants looked longer in trials where the adult held the second object, suggesting surprise that the actor's gaze and expressed positive regard toward a particular object did not influence their later action (Phillips et al., 2002) . Finally, Moses and colleagues (2001) showed that infants are able to assimilate knowledge of gaze direction and the referent of an emotional message. When an actor made a negatively valenced noise, 12-and 18-month-olds looked up from the novel object in their hand to follow the gaze of the actor. Later, the infants avoided the object associated with the negative feelings of the actor.
Representing other people's beliefs
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to our abilities to make inferences about the beliefs of others and to understand that individuals act according to those beliefs (Wimmer and Perner, 1983) . The prerequisite for ToM is the awareness that others' thoughts, beliefs, and motivation differ from our own and can explain their behavior (Frith and Frith, 1999) . Within developmental psychology, children are typically credited with possessing a mature ToM when they understand that a person's beliefs motivate his or her actions (even when those beliefs conflict with reality) (Wellman et al., 2001) . While sometimes discussed as an all-or-nothing construct, ToM follows a developmental course over the first 5 years that includes apparent transitions and intermediate steps. Most accounts of the development of ToM highlight the transition between the ages of 3 and 4 years, observed by the passing of tests involving object transfer problems, with most typically developing children achieving full competency in ToM by age 5 years.
The "False Belief" task has been the most widely used test of children's ToM (Wimmer and Perner, 1983) . In the now classic version of this task (the "object transfer" problem), the child listens to a story in which a character's belief about the location of an object is falsified when it is moved unbeknownst to the character. Children who state that the character believes that the object is in its original location pass the test. Dozens of versions of the standard False Belief problem have now been used, and while the precise age of success varies between children and between task versions (Wellman et al., 2001 ), children younger than 3 or 4 years generally fail, while older children generally pass.
With slight modifications, younger children can demonstrate a grasp of ToM problems if not required to give a verbal explanation (Clements and Perner, 1994; Garnham and Ruffman, 2001 ). Moreover, Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) have shown that infants as young as 15 months may possess some false belief understanding. Infants viewed an actor playing with a toy and then depositing it into a green box. As a partition shielded the actor's view, the toy was moved from the green box to a neighboring yellow box. When the scene once again became visible to the actor, infants looked longer when the actor reached for the toy in the yellow box (an unexpected event), than when the actor reached to the green box. The authors interpreted this as evidence that 15-monthold infants possess a rudimentary ToM.
Brain mechanisms for social cognition
Our abilities to understand and anticipate the actions, intentions, emotions, thoughts, and beliefs of others have long been the subject of psychological and philosophical inquiry. More recently, cognitive neuroscientists have begun to identify the neural circuitry that supports these social abilities. In the first extensive review of the literature on nonhuman primates, Brothers (1990) proposed that a range of social functions engages three neuroanatomical regions: the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the amygdala (AMY), and the orbitofrontal cortices (OFC). Over the past decade, noninvasive functional neuroimaging in adults has dramatically expanded our knowledge of the key cortical and subcortical regions implicated in social-cognitive processes, some of which are illustrated in Figure 5 .1. Before focusing on the development of these regions, we discuss below some of what neuroimaging studies of adult humans have told us about the function of each region implicated in social cognition.
Social perception: biological motion, goal-directed action, gaze, and facial expressions Located in the ventral occipitotemporal cortex, the lateral fusiform gyrus (FFG) containing the "fusiform face area" (FFA) is implicated in face perception and recognition (e.g., Kanwisher et al., 1997; Puce et al., 1996) . The extrastriate body area (EBA) has been implicated in the visual perception of human bodies (e.g., Downing et al., 2001 ). The STS region, particularly the posterior STS, has been implicated in the interpretation of the actions and social intentions of others through the analysis of biological motion cues, including eye, hand, and other body movements (e.g., Bonda et al., 1996; Pelphrey et al., 2003a) . Also related to the perception of biological motion, the "mirror neuron system" in humans is involved in both the execution of a motor action and the observation of a motor action performed by another person (e.g., Buccino et al., 2001; Rizzolatti et al., 1996) . Finally, the AMY is highly interconnected with other cortical and subcortical brain structures and implicated in determining the emotional states of others through analysis of facial expressions (e.g., Morris et al., 1996) . Beyond its role in the perception of facial emotion, the AMY plays a central and complex role in multiple aspects of emotion (e.g., Davis and Whalen, 2001; Kluver and Bucy, 1997; LeDoux, 2000) .
Theory of mind and self cognition
Four additional cortical regions have been reliably implicated in certain advanced aspects of social cognition including ToM and self cognition. The temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) appears, in adults, to be particularly selective for reasoning about beliefs (e.g., Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003) . Further, the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) is implicated in reasoning about others' beliefs, self-reflection (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002; Northoff et al., 2006; Saxe and Powell, 2006) , and autobiographical memory (Shannon and Buckner, 2004) . The MPFC has been shown to be activated by a wide range of tasks that require inferences concerning intentions and mental states (e.g., Castelli et al., 2002; Frith and Frith, 1999) , the attribution of emotion to self and others (e.g., Ochsner et al., 2004) , self-reflection generally (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002) , and representations of semantic knowledge about the psychological aspects of others (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2005) . Additionally, the precuneus or posterior cingulate in the medial parietal cortex (MPPC) is more active during selfknowledge retrieval than during other types of social or semantic tasks (e.g., D 'Argembeau et al., 2005) .
Functional neuroimaging of the developing social brain
Mapping the development of brain mechanisms for social perception While cognitive neuroscientists have generated a wealth of information regarding the brain regions involved in social perception and social cognition in the mature adult brain, only within the last few years has research begun to address the brain mechanisms involved in these domains in children using fMRI. These investigations have focused on the perception of faces, whole-body biological motion, and direction of gaze. Table 5 .1 provides a summary of the major findings to date. It is noteworthy that no study in this table employed a longitudinal design and no study using fMRI included children younger than 6 years, reflecting the challenges involved in scanning young children (see Chapter 17).
The earliest developmental studies of brain regions involved in social cognition examined the role of the lateral FFG in face processing using fMRI and event-related potentials (ERPs). In an elegant series of studies, Taylor and colleagues (1999) found that the specialization of the N170 response to faces, thought to reflect face-specific structural encoding, continues to develop from early childhood into young adulthood. Notably, the response to eyes appears to mature more rapidly than responses to other facial features (Taylor et al., 2001) , underscoring the precedence of gaze perception in face processing. In an fMRI study of face perception, Aylward and her colleagues (2005) found that 12-to 14-year-old children exhibited a greater blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) response in the FFG when viewing faces than did younger children (8-10 years old).
More recent studies have continued to examine the development of face-selective activity in the FFG in children of various ages. Scherf and colleagues (2007) compared the activity evoked by pictures of places, faces, and objects in 6-to 14-year-old children. They were unable to identify face-selective activation in the FFG of the younger children, but were able to localize the FFA in adolescents and adults. In contrast, the localization of brain activity evoked by pictures of places and objects was equivalent in adults and children. Subsequently, Golijeh and colleagues (2007) reported that children as young as 7 years had face-selective activity localized to the FFG, but the volume of activation in the FFA and parahippocampal gyrus to faces and places, respectively, increased across the 7-to 11-years-old period and correlated with improved recognition memory for the respective stimulus class. In contrast, when children viewed faces, a face-sensitive region of the posterior STS was equally active across the observed age range. The picture emerging from this line of research is one of different developmental pathways for the FFA versus the face-sensitive area of the posterior STS. The FFA appears to follow a more protracted development course compared to the STS region. The posterior STS region is thought to be involved in representing dynamic aspects of faces including emotional expressions and direction of eye gaze (Hoffman and Haxby, 2000; LaBar et al., 2002; McCarthy, 1999; Mosconi et al., 2005) , while the FFA has been implicated in the structural encoding of a face as such (McCarthy, 1999) and in the recognition of identity (Hoffman and Haxby, 2000) .
Our laboratory has examined the development of brain regions involved in representing the actions and intentions of others. In one study (Pelphrey et al., 2003a) , we examined the degree to which the STS activation is selective for biological motion in children aged 7-10 years. We compared four different motion conditions: a walking man, a walking robot, a moving disjointed mechanical figure with the same components as the robot, and a grandfather clock with a swinging pendulum. The walking man and robot represent biological movement, while the mechanical figure and swinging pendulum represent nonbiological motion. A network of brain regions was identified that exhibited greater responses to biological (robot and human walking) than to nonbiological motion (disjointed mechanical figure and grandfather clock), including the posterior STS and portions of the purported human mirror neuron system, including the inferior frontal gyri, the precentral gyri, and middle and superior frontal gyri (Carter and Pelphrey, 2007) . Additionally, increasing specificity for biological motion with age was seen in the right posterior STS. The magnitude of the difference between the response to biological and nonbiological motion was positively correlated with age in the right posterior STS region (r ¼ 0.64, p < 0.05).
Moving beyond the representation of wholebody biological motion to the question of how the developing brain represents the intentions of actions, we used an incongruent versus congruent gaze paradigm, illustrated in Figure 5 .2, with children aged 7-10 years. A flashing checkerboard was shown on one side of an animated face, which either turned to look at (congruent) or away from (incongruent) the flashing object. Based on our prior findings in adults (Pelphrey et al., 2003b) , we hypothesized that STS activity would differentiate congruent from incongruent trials, reflecting the ability of typically developing children to link the perception of the gaze shift with its mentalistic significance. Similar to adults, children showed greater activation of the posterior STS to congruent, relative to incongruent, eye gaze, reflecting sensitivity to intent (Mosconi et al., 2005) . These findings suggest that the neural circuitry underlying the processing of eye gaze and the detection of intentions from gaze in children is functional by middle childhood and similar to that of adults.
Development of brain circuitry for emotion understanding
Several fMRI studies to date have focused on the biological basis of emotion processing, with a particular concentration on the AMY's response to emotional facial expressions. Baird and colleagues (1999) demonstrated AMY activation to fearful faces in adolescents, aged 12-17 years. Subsequently, it was reported that adults demonstrated greater AMY activation to fearful than to neutral facial expressions, whereas 11-year-old children showed greater AMY activation in response to neutral faces (Thomas et al., 2001 ). The authors argued that the neutral faces were experienced as more ambiguous than fearful facial expressions, thereby accounting for the increased AMY activation in response to the neutral faces. In addition, Killgore and others (2001) reported sex differences in AMY development in children and adolescents. Whereas the left AMY responded to fearful facial expressions in all children, activity decreased over the adolescent period in females, but not in males. In addition, Lobaugh and colleagues (2006) found that, similar to adults (Phan et al., 2002) , different patterns of activation for the processing of fearful, disgusted, and sad facial expressions were present in 10-year-old children, even in the absence of conscious processing. These circuits included the AMY, parahippocampal gyrus, insula and cingulate gyrus, the fusiform, and superior temporal gyri. Adolescents did, however, show more activation in the "fear circuit" comprising the AMY, orbitofrontal cortices, and the anterior cingulate cortex in response to fearful faces than did adults. Finally, Guyer and colleagues (in press) found that AMY and fusiform activation to fearful expressions was greater in adolescents than adults. Furthermore, they observed greater functional connectivity between the AMY and hippocampus in adults compared to adolescents. They speculated that this effect may indicate greater learning or habituation to fearful faces in adults. Eye movement data collected outside the scanner indicated that this difference was not attributable to differential scanpaths when viewing a fearful face.
Brain mechanisms for the development of theory of mind
Only a few studies have addressed the development of brain mechanisms supporting the emergence of ToM. Studying children, aged 9-16 years, Moriguchi et al. (2007) reported significant activation in the STS and MPFC during a ToM task. A significant positive correlation between age and activation in the dorsal MPFC and a significant negative correlation between age and the ventral MPFC were seen. No age-related changes were found in the STS. The authors argued that ToM-related activation in the MPFC shifts from ventral to dorsal during late childhood and adolescence and that this effect may be related to the maturation of the prefrontal cortex. Pfeifer and colleagues (2007) conducted the first developmental study addressing the role of the MPFC in self and other reflection. In a clever design, children, aged 9-10, and adults were shown short phrases taken from standard self-esteem scales (e.g., I am popular) during fMRI scanning. Subjects were asked to rate how much the phrase described them and how much the phrase described the fictional character Harry Potter. Both children and adults activated the MPFC more during self, as compared to other, knowledge retrieval. Children activated the MPFC to a higher degree than adults while reflecting upon the self, possibly due to a lack of automaticity in the children's self-knowledge retrieval process.
When considering the behavioral literature on the development of social cognition relative to the fMRI studies of the brain mechanisms supporting social cognitive processes (particularly those related to ToM) in children, one notices an obvious disconnect between the ages of the children studied in the two lines of research. Most of the behavioral findings focus on transitions occurring from birth to age 5 years. In contrast, the fMRI studies generally begin at age 6 years. This disconnect reflects methodological hurdles. Continued development of more "infant-friendly" neuroimaging techniques such as near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) and advances in the use of fMRI for younger children will allow researchers to begin to directly study changes in brain function occurring before, during, and after key developmental transitions in social cognitive abilities. Currently, the study of resting levels of functional connectivity between social brain structures (identified in studies of adults; Greicius et al., 2003) in infant and toddlers is a promising approach. These measurements can be taken while children sleep inside of the scanner.
Age-related differences in findings reported in behavioral versus imaging studies also raise important theoretical issues. Several of the neuroimaging studies reviewed here have exposed progressive changes across childhood and adolescence in the functioning of social brain structures, with a trend toward increasing specialization of function for various social cognitive abilities with age. These neurofunctional changes are occurring later than many of the well-documented developmental transitions in social cognitive abilities. The changes in social brain function occurring in children from age 6 years onwards cannot logically be the neural basis for earlier occurring behavioral changes.
What might account for the differences in agerelated changes related to ToM reported in behavioral versus neuroimaging studies? The developmental transitions reported in behavioral studies at younger ages are likely to be related to as yet undiscovered earlier changes in the structures that comprise the social brain. The structures involved in the acquisition of social cognition abilities may differ from those that ultimately come to serve and elaborate those functions. For instance, early in development, a nascent ability could be subserved via one set of mechanisms. Then, with further brain maturation, the growing ability might come to depend on another set of mechanisms. For example, we might expect to observe subcortical to cortical shifts in the localization of function. We might also predict that functions become increasingly shifted toward heteromodal, tertiary association cortices. Importantly, this possibility highlights the potential role of the child's own activity in shaping the development of specialization in particular brain structures. On the whole, developmental psychologists tend to focus on the earliest emergence of particular cognitive abilities. Later, more subtle developmental changes (e.g., integration with language abilities, and integration with executive function systems involved in planning and action monitoring) will be important to understand in relationship to neuroimaging findings. Neuroimaging studies might actually serve to highlight important transition points for novel behavioral studies.
To illustrate this last point, Saxe and colleagues (in press) presented 6-to 11-year-old children with short stories and illustrations during fMRI scanning. Within each story were subsections describing physical facts, the story character's appearance and social relations, or the character's mental states. Similar to adults, the right TPJ was most active while listening to descriptions of others' mental states. Further, in the youngest children, the right TPJ was recruited equally for any information about a person, while in the older children, as in adults, the right TPJ was recruited only for descriptions of mental states. Developmental studies of ToM have historically focused on children between ages 3 and 5, when they first pass the paradigmatic False Belief task. These new results, by contrast, suggest that the neural organization underlying ToM is still changing 5 years later. Future work will be necessary to determine the possible behavioral correlates of this late neural specialization. It is also conceivable that the neural substrates change in the absence of noticeable behavioral change, or that behaviors simply become more automatic (but do not change qualitatively) with associated neural changes.
Functional connectivity as a mechanism of development
Models of the social brain frequently emphasize the unique contributions of specific neuroanatomical regions. While this analytical perspective is helpful in providing a framework for organizing our emerging understanding of social brain development, it fails to capture the complexity of interactions among these and other brain regions. These are better understood as nodes in a network of regions subserving different aspects of social cognition. To date, these components have been studied extensively in adults and occasionally in older children and adolescents, but their integration has been relatively neglected in both age groups. More critically, the role of changes in functional connectivity over development as a mechanism underlying ontogenetic changes in social cognition has only begun to be examined (Guyer et al., in press ). Recent developments in techniques for studying functional connectivity (e.g., Just et al., 2004; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005) now allow neuroscientists to move toward brain-based, mechanistic theories of social cognitive development.
In Figure 5 .3, we propose a preliminary model for thinking about the development of social cognition and its neural basis from an "interacting, developing brain systems" perspective. The aspects of social cognition include those most frequently studied in children and/or adults using fMRI. As illustrated by the left-to-right stair-step-like organization, we think of each component as an increasingly sophisticated aspect of social cognition. The horizontal arrows originating from each construct represent the continued development of each along its own trajectory from infancy through adolescence that serves as a building block for, and is influenced by, more sophisticated aspects of social cognition. The model predicts that increasingly sophisticated forms of social cognition arise as a result of the enhanced efficiency or connectivity within brain networks involved in various components of social cognition. Contributing neurobiological mechanisms may include myelination and synaptic pruning.
Conclusion: the value of a developmental perspective on the social brain At present, little is known about the neural correlates of social cognition in children or about the changes in brain function that underlie normative development in this domain. Fundamental questions concerning brain maturation in relationship to changes in social cognition remain unanswered. But the future is bright. Developmental fMRI studies will allow the field to construct normative developmental curves for the functioning of circuits supporting different aspects of social cognition. The availability of these normative data will facilitate efforts to characterize atypical developmental pathways and may improve our ability to develop more effective interventions for social deficits. Functional brain correlates or neurobiological markers of social cognition may prove useful in the early identification of children at risk for difficulties in social information processing. The STS region has emerged as a region that is quite promising in this regard (Pelphrey et al., 2005) . To the extent that this research can elucidate developmental trajectories of the neural circuitry supporting pivotal, early social cognitive abilities, it can inform the design of more effective programs for the identification and remediation of children at risk for difficulties in these areas. Further, functional neuroimaging techniques may provide a means for assessing the efficacy of treatment and reveal whether behavioral improvements correspond to compensatory changes in brain function or the normalization of developmental pathways.
Finally, by defining brain phenotypes based on neurofunctional activation patterns, fMRI studies of children hold potential for dissecting the heterogeneity present in neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism. Early and longitudinal study will be critical in defining brain phenotypes because developmental trajectories of brain functioning are expected to be more informative than the Figure 5 .3. Model of the development of social cognition as driven by increases in functional connectivity. The rectangles on the left represent aspects of social cognition most frequently studied to date using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The rectangles on the right indicate the brain regions onto which the constructs on the left loosely map. The stairstep organization reflects an increasing developmental sophistication, with the lower boxes providing the supporting building blocks for those above. The horizontal and circular arrows originating from each box indicate continued development from infancy through adolescence, whereby the processes and their neural substrates both support the development of higher-level processes (bottom-up) while being influenced by them (top-down). AMY, amygdala; EBA, extrastriate body area; FFA, fusiform face area; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; STS, superior temporal sulcus; TPJ, temporo-parietal junction.
analysis of brain phenotypes in adults. As a case in point, imaging studies have provided noteworthy findings regarding correlations between structural developmental trajectories and level of general intelligence in older children and adolescents. Shaw and colleagues (2006) reported that the pattern of age-related change in cortical thickness (rather than that at any one time point) was closely related to level of intelligence. Knowledge of the development of the "social brain" may aid researchers in their search for genetic and possible environmental factors related to suboptimal social cognitive development.
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